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ABSTRACT
In this paper we empirically test the importance and the effects of 
labour taxation on employment in Croatia. The motivation for this 
analytical inquiry stems from the fact that Croatia is one of the 
countries with the lowest employment rates in the European Union 
while at the same time it has relatively high labour tax burden 
compared to peers and ranks among the countries with most negative 
perceived effects of taxation on incentives to work. As fiscal policy 
is the main economic policy instrument in Croatia, it is important 
to analyse whether fiscal measures can directly affect labour market 
performance. Our results show that tax policy has significant effect 
on employment in Croatia which has important policy implications.
1. Introduction
Croatia ranks near the bottom of the European Union countries with respect to employment 
rate (percentage of labour force that is employed). Such an unfavourable rank cannot be 
attributed to the effects of prolonged recession from 2009 to 2014, since Croatia’s position 
worsened only slightly when compared to pre-2009 period. According to Eurostat data, 
after the peak of the business cycle in 2008, employment rate (20–64 years) in Croatia 
stood at 64.9%, which has put the country at the fifth place from the bottom of the scale. 
Meanwhile, in 2016, the figure stood at 61.4% and Croatia was positioned second from the 
bottom of the scale.
Activity of country’s population on the labour market is determined by various demo-
graphic and socio-economic factors (see for example Aarson et al. (2014) and Nestić and 
Tomić, (2017)). However, theoretical models and empirical literature indicate that one of 
the important factors lays also in the domain of fiscal policy in the form of tax burden on 
labour income. In international comparisons, countries with higher tax burden on labour 
tend to have lower employment rates as reservation wages are higher and people are less 
motivated to enter employment (income–leisure trade off).
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In this context it is important to emphasise that there are various papers indicating that 
labour taxation in Croatia is relatively excessive and/or that there is still room for additional 
reduction of tax burden which would be beneficial for labour market. For example, Blažić 
(2006) points out that Croatia has high tax burden (especially due to social contributions), 
while Šeparović (2009) shows that tax wedge in Croatia is above Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) average and concludes that the tax wedge in 
Croatia is still quite large and that work should be done to reduce it. Grdović Gnip and Tomić 
(2010) show that Croatia is clustered among E.U. countries with high taxation. Deskar-
Škrbić and Šimović (2014) also show that Croatia belongs to the group of countries with 
high tax wedges. Blažić and Trošelj (2012) warn that adjusted methodology in tax wedge 
calculation puts Croatia lower on the scale (which was confirmed also in papers presented 
in Urban (2016)), but that this shouldn’t discourage policy makers to continue to reduce 
labour taxation. In addition, according to the latest Global Competitiveness Report, Croatia 
is ranked 134/138 countries in the world by the indicator ‘effects of taxation on incentives 
to work’ (World Economic Forum, 2016).
Thus, in this paper we analyse the effects of labour taxation, in terms of tax wedge, on 
employment in Croatia from the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2016. We 
use small-scale vector autoregressive model (V.A.R.), which is a novelty in the literature as 
most of the researches on similar topic are based on panel data approach or cluster anal-
ysis. The relatively short sample period is determined by data availability, but it includes 
boom (2000–2008), bust (2009–2014) and recovery (2015–2016) phases of the business 
cycle, which allows us to control our results for the effects of economic environment on 
the labour market.
The paper is structured as follows. After the Introduction at the beginning, in the second 
part of the paper we present and discuss a theoretical framework of the analysis in terms 
of imperfect labour market wage setting, price setting (W.S.-P.S.) model. Next, we present 
a brief literature review, mostly focusing on the research that includes Croatia (to make 
our results more comparable). In the fourth part we present empirical approach and data 
and discuss our results. The paper ends with the Conclusion where we emphasise policy 
implications based on the results.
2. Theoretical framework: W.S.-P.S. model with a tax wedge
In macroeconomics there are two common theoretical approaches to labour market analysis. 
The first is based on the assumption of the classical (competitive) labour market, while the 
second is based on imperfect competition model of labour markets, with frictions in the job 
creation process, wage bargaining or imperfect information (for the analysis of classic labour 
market see Gartner (2006) and for imperfect labour market see Carlin and Soskice (2006)).
The institutional framework and structure of the Croatian labour market are closer to the 
framework of imperfect markets as they are characterised by relatively low overall flexibil-
ity, a high level of employment protection, barriers to entry, a complicated firing practice, 
duality, bargaining etc. (Kunovac I Pufnik 2015). Thus, in this paper we will briefly present 
the effects of taxation on the labour market in most commonly used theoretical models of 
imperfect labour market – W.S.-P.S.
The W.S.-P.S. model is based on the assumption that prices and wages in the economy 
are determined by the bargaining process. Employers set producer prices based on the 
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level of wages with addition of a mark-up, while employees bargain on net wages with their 
bargaining power depending on the level of employment and institutional characteristics 
of the labour market (minimum wage, labour protection etc.). A W.S.-P.S. model with a tax 
wedge is based on the following logic (notation is based on Tica (2015)).
Consumer prices Pc in the economy are defined as producer prices P adjusted for indirect 
tax rate Tv, such as value added tax (V.A.T.), which is presented in Equation 1:
 
Producer prices are determined by wages W increased by a mark-up μ and all direct taxes 
(income tax, social contributions paid by the employees and by the employers) labelled as 
Td. In other words, producer prices are determined by gross wages and a mark-up, which 
is shown in Equation 2.
Price setting curve:
 
By combining Equations 1 and 2 we can get an expression for the real wage which employers 
‘leave’ to the employees (Equation 3).
 
Tax wedge is the difference between the real net wage paid to employees W
Pc
 (real consump-
tion wage) and real gross waged paid by the employers (real product wage) W(1+Td)
P
. Gross 
wages are higher than net wages by the amount of total direct taxes, while difference in 
prices comes from indirect taxes.
To complete the model, we have to define the wage setting curve. As mentioned, employ-
ees are bargaining on the real net wage, W
Pc
 which depends on the factors mentioned above: 
institutional characteristics of the labour market z, and the level of employment N (α is the 
elasticity), which is presented in Equation 4.
Wage setting curve:
 
By combining Equations 2 and 3 we can get the expression for the level of employment 
(Equation 5).
 
Equation 5 shows that the level of employment depends on institutional characteristics of 
the labour market, level of mark-up and effects of taxation. In this paper we focus on the 
effect of labour taxation, so based on Equation 5 we can conclude that increase of labour 
taxes (thus the tax wedge) has negative effects on the level of employment in an imperfect 
(1)Pc =
(
1 + Tv
)
P
(2)P = (1 + 휇)WGross = (1 + 휇)
(
1 + Td
)
W
(3)
W
Pc
=
1
(1 + 휇)
(
1 + Td
)(
1 + Tv
)
(4)
W
Pc
= f (N , z) = z + 훼N
(5)N =
1
(1 + 휇)
(
1 + Td
)(
1 + Tv
)
훼
−
z
훼
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labour market (such as that in Croatia). This is also our main hypothesis in the empirical 
part of the paper.
3. A brief literature review on the effects of labour taxation on labour 
market outcomes in Croatia
Although the effects of labour taxation on labour market indicators are subject to many 
international studies which include various countries and regions, due to comparability of 
our results, in this paper we present those focused on Croatia (for more extensive literature 
review see Dolenc et al. (2011)).
The importance of the discussion on the effects of tax burden on labour market in Croatia 
was recognised early. Nestić (1998) compares Croatia to transitional peers and concludes 
that the social security burden at that time was relatively high which partially contributed 
to the rise of the informal sector of the economy (reducing formal employment). Also, the 
author shows that tax wedge (then standing at around 45.2%) was extremely high and was 
discouraging for both employers and employees. Obadić (2004) concludes that Croatia 
has relatively high gross wages compared to its peers and to the level of productivity due to 
employees’ social contributions, which hurts the competitiveness of the labour market (and 
thus employment). Kesner Škreb (2007) also emphasises the importance of tax burden for 
labour costs and consequently competitiveness and proposes its reduction, mostly through 
cuts in social contributions.
Šeparović (2009) uses cluster analysis and shows that there is a relationship between 
the size of tax wedge and unemployment and concludes that Croatia is a country with a 
high tax wedge and a high unemployment rate. This leads the author to the conclusion 
that the reduction of tax wedge could lead to the fall in the unemployment rate. Grdović 
Gnip and Tomić (2010) confirm these results, also using cluster analysis, and show that 
Croatia belongs to a group of countries with higher tax burden and higher unemployment 
rate (lower employment rate). Dolenc et al. (2011) use panel analysis for 39 countries, 
including Croatia, and show that tax wedge has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on unemployment rate (increase in tax wedge increases unemployment rate) in all model 
specifications. In addition, the authors point out that the results of the analysis with employ-
ment rate as the dependent variable showed mildly negative but not statistically significant 
effect of tax wedge.
4. Methodology, data and results
Our methodological approach is based on vector auto regression as in our view V.A.R. 
models can be very useful for the analysis of proposed research problem. Firstly, V.A.R. 
models treat all variables as endogenous which is suitable for the analysis of the labour 
markets as performance and main determinants of labour market are strongly inter-related 
and it is hard to point out some purely exogenous factors. Secondly, inclusion of lags in 
the analysis enables us to capture the effect of persistency on the labour market and nature 
of fiscal policy where implementation takes time so changes in policy instruments affect 
‘policy targets’ with a lag. Finally, results of V.A.R. models in terms of impulse responses 
directly show direction, strength and statistical significance of the effects of policy shocks.
We base our analysis on a bivariate V.A.R. model:
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Vector Xt includes annual changes of a cyclically adjusted level of employment (g
CA
E,t ) and tax 
wedge (gTW ,t). Vector ut represents the vector of innovations of the this reduced form V.A.R. 
model, where ut ∼ (0,
∑
u). The number of time lags is set to 2 based on Akaike informa-
tion criteria, while a greater number of lags is not desirable also due to the relatively small 
sample. Model adequacy tests (stability, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity) are shown 
in Appendix 1, and they indicate that our model is suitable for the analysis.
As labour market developments are highly correlated to the phase of business cycle we 
cyclically-adjusted the annual change in employment by regressing it on the real gross 
domestic product (G.D.P.) growth rate and taking the residuals:
 
 
In this way we can focus on the analysis of ‘structural’ employment which is mostly depend-
ent on supply-side shocks, such as tax policy shocks (cyclical part of employment is driven 
by demand-side policies). We chose employment as the key labour market indicator since 
unemployment (rate), which is mostly used in other research, is strongly affected by the 
effects of migration (more pronounced in Croatia since 2013), stricter rules of registration 
and deletion from the Employment Bureau (notable changes in 2014) and number of dis-
couraged workers (also on rise in recessions).
Tax wedge calculation was based on Grdovic Gnip and Tomic (2010) and Deskar-Škrbić 
and Šimović (2014), where it is defined as income tax + all social security contributions + all 
additional income levies divided by total labour costs. Gross wage is defined by the O.E.C.D. 
methodology in sectors B-N (According to International Standard Industrial Classification 
sectors B-N include B: Mining and quarrying; C: Manufacturing; D: Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning supply; E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remedia-
tion activities; F: Construction; G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; H: Transportation and storage; I: Accommodation and food service activities; 
J: Information and communication; K: Financial and insurance activities; L: Real estate 
activities; M: Professional, scientific and technical activities; N: Administrative and support 
service activities.) (Isic Rev.4). Although we acknowledge methodological issues pointed out 
in Blažić and Trošelj (2012), we decided to include all social contributions (for discussion 
on this matter see Deskar-Škrbić and Šimović (2014)).
Figure 1 shows dynamics of original growth rate of employment, cyclically adjusted 
growth rate of employment and annual changes in tax wedge (source for all variables is the 
Croatian Bureau of Statistics).
The biggest changes in tax wedge were recorded in early 2000s (firstly increase of personal 
allowance, reduction of income tax rates and cut in contribution for pensions on salary in 
2000 and 2001, effects of pension system reform in 2002, increase of personal allowance in 
2003), in 2009 and 2011 (introduction and abolition of ‘crisis tax’), 2012 (increase of personal 
allowance and cut in healthcare contribution), 2014 (increase of healthcare contribution to 
pre-2012 level) and 2015 (broad income tax reform). Detailed discussion on these changes 
is available in Grdovic Gnip and Tomic (2010) and Šimović and Deskar-Škrbić (2015).
(6)Xt = 훼 +
p∑
i=1
AiXt−i + ut ,
(7.1)gE = 훽0 + 훽1g + 휀t ,
(7.2)gCAE = gE − ĝE
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Have these changes affected employment in the analysed period? Figure 2 shows impulse 
response of a one standard deviation shock in tax wedge on cyclically adjusted employment.
It can be seen that this effect is negative and that it is statistically significant in five peri-
ods after the shock. This result suggests that an increase in tax wedge reduces employment 
and that labour tax policy has a statistically significant effect on the employment level. This 
is in line with theoretical assumptions and the findings of other research presented in the 
literature review.
Although these results are based on the stable model with no autocorrelation and heter-
oscedasticity, from the methodological point of view it is necessary to emphasise some lim-
itations that can significantly affect the results of the model. Firstly, due to the unavailability 
of a longer measurement period (G.D.P. growth rate is available since 2000), the sample on 
which this analysis is based is relatively small. Secondly, economic shock and policy shock 
in 2009 (strong fall of the economy and introduction of ‘crisis tax’) can be seen as outliers 
which could have affected results. Thirdly, due to the unavailability of data and the limited 
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Figure 1. annual changes in employment, cyclically adjusted employment and tax wedge. source: authors’ 
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Figure 2. Effects of a one standard deviation shock in a tax wedge on cyclically adjusted employment 
(impulse response) 2000–2016. source: authors’ calculations.
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size of the sample, we could not directly observe the effects of some other relevant variables 
such as employment protection legislation, minimum wage etc. Furthermore, introduction 
of variables in different formats also can have an influence on the results. Finally, again 
because of the limited length of time series, it was not possible to conduct the robustness 
check by estimating the model on two separate, shorter samples.
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
Taxation can significantly affect employment trends in the economy. Excessive taxation can 
disturb the proper functioning of labour market by distorting incentives for work. Also, 
high tax burdens discourage employers to hire new workers, boost incentives for reduction 
of employment in recessions and stimulate employment in informal sector of the economy. 
For this reason, emphasis of tax policy should increasingly be put on finding those elements 
of the tax system which cause biggest distortions and bring them to the minimum. It is 
generally recommended to reduce the total tax burden in the economy, disperse the tax 
burden from the employers and workers to other tax forms with broader tax base (such as 
consumption) and increase flexibility on the labour market.
These general recommendations are also important for Croatia as in this paper we showed 
that labour taxation, through the tax wedge, has a statistically significant effect on employ-
ment. More precisely, our results indicate that increases in tax wedge have statistically 
significant negative effects on the level of employment, which is in line with theoretical 
assumptions and findings of other research on the effects of taxation on the Croatian labour 
market. In recent years we could see that policy makers have put more efforts in the reduc-
tion of tax wedge (tax reform of minister Lalovac in 2015 and of minister Maric in 2017).
However, general public and policy makers in Croatia are still mostly focused on income 
tax. This can be seen from the frequent changes in personal income tax. In this context 
it should be stressed that income tax is a complex tax form, and that any change causes 
a number of consequences not only in the fiscal and distribution contexts but also in the 
segments of fiscal equalisation and financing of local government units. Thus, policy makers 
in Croatia should continue to reduce the tax wedge in Croatia but the focus should be on 
social contributions. However, this path seems more challenging as more pronounced cuts 
in social contributions have to be accompanied by structural reforms in healthcare, social 
security, and pension systems.
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Appendix 1.
Figure A1. V.A.R. stability test. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table A1.  V.A.R. Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests.
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h
Date: 06/12/17 Time: 09:47
Sample: 2000Q1 2016Q4
Included observations: 66
Lags Lm-stat Prob
1  9.731357  0.0552
2  6.299316  0.1779
3  2.267795  0.6866
4  18.10535  0.0912
5  4.708091  0.3186
6  4.561696  0.3353
7  5.011040  0.2862
8  6.275262  0.1795
9  6.478210  0.1662
10  5.118889  0.2753
11  6.111428  0.1910
12  6.742210  0.1502
Probs from chi-square with 4 df.
source: authors’ calculations.
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Table A2. V.A.R. Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares).
Date: 06/12/17 Time: 09:47
Sample: 2000Q1 2016Q4
Included observations: 66
 joint test:
chi-sq df Prob.
 35.82111 24  0.0571
 individual components:
Dependent R-squared F(8,57) Prob. chi-sq(8) Prob.
res1*res1  0.179907  1.563044  0.1565  11.87389  0.1569
res2*res2  0.235273  2.192054  0.0415  15.52804  0.0497
res2*res1  0.163438  1.391997  0.2198  10.78688  0.2141
source: authors’ calculations.
